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Restitution, meaning the law of unjust enrichment, is not sup-
posed to be punitive in purpose or effect., The first Restatement of
Restitution treats this proposition as axiomatic:
Actions for restitution have for their primary purpose taking
from the defendant and restoring to the plaintiff something to
which the plaintiff is entitled, or if this is not done, causing the de-
fendant to pay the plaintiff an amount which will restore the plain-
tiff to the position in which he was before the defendant received
the benefit. If the value of what was received and what was lost
were always equal, there would be no substantial problem as to the
amount of recovery, since actions of restitution are not punitive.2
As an observation this is much more true than false, and in the
contexts where it is typically repeated it conveys a useful reminder.
The basis of a liability in restitution is that the defendant has been
enriched without legal justification at the expense of the plaintiff; it is
not that the defendant has necessarily done anything wrong. This
means that the defendant's innocence or passivity in the transaction
will not of itself constitute a defense. It also means that the defen-
* Professor of Law, Boston University; Reporter, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT. Comments by Mark Gergen and Daniel Friedmann
are gratefully acknowledged.
1. The statement assumes a sharp distinction between "restitution" as a term of art
meaning "unjust enrichment law," and "restitution" as part of the sentence imposed in some
criminal cases. The present Essay is concerned with the first sort of restitution. In the
sentencing context,-by contrast, the question whether restitution is punitive is actively litigated,
with important practical consequences in a variety of contexts. (In both these respects it is
unlike the question under discussion, with which indeed it has nothing to do.) Compare Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1986) (restitution order following conviction for welfare fraud is
punitive, with the consequence that it is not dischargeable in bankruptcy), with United States v.
Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2001) (restitution order following conviction for social
security fraud is not punitive, with the consequence that it is not abated by the death of the
convicted criminal and may be enforced against the decedent's estate).
2. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, introductory note to ch. 8, Topic 2, at 595-96 (1937)
(emphasis added).
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dant's bad conduct will not be the basis for enhanced or exemplary
liability.
As an axiom, however, the statement that restitution is not puni-
tive is false. Perhaps we might say, instead, that an affirmative claim
to restitution never depends on a punitive rationale. The reason to
hedge the simpler formula is that restitution does punish, but it
punishes negatively: not by imposing liability on disfavored parties,
nor by enhancing the liability to which disfavored parties are subject,
but by denying a restitutionary claim (or counterclaim) to which the
disfavored party would otherwise be entitled. Naturally, any claimant
whom a court finds unattractive will tend to find his legal recourse
restricted, whatever the theory of his cause of action. But restitu-
tion's systematic use of this negative sanction-a kind of limited
outlawry-appears to distinguish claims based on unjust enrichment
from claims based on contract or tort.
The object of this preliminary Essay is to indicate two contexts in
which restitution applies its negative sanction; and to offer an expla-
nation, not especially surprising, for the association between restitu-
tion and this distinctive form of punishment. First, however, we
attempt to clear the ground by distinguishing some features of
restitution that should not be regarded as punitive, despite initial
appearances to the contrary.
I. RESTITUTION Is NOT PUNITIVE WHEN IT ALLOWS A CLAIM.
The idea that restitution is not punitive is probably most instruc-
tive at the point where it first appears doubtful. The salient feature of
most restitution for wrongs-the fact that the remedy gives the
plaintiff more than he lost-seems to point toward a punitive ration-
ale. Indeed, both the fact of the windfall to the plaintiff and its most
compelling explanation make restitution resemble an award of
punitive damages. Restitution strips the conscious wrongdoer of a
gain realized in violation of the plaintiff's rights, in order to preclude
any possibility that an unauthorized invasion of the protected interest
of another might be profitable notwithstanding a liability for dam-
ages.3  Both disgorgement and punitive damages are therefore
3. In Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983), a case of copyright infringe-
ment, Judge Posner states the utilitarian justification for the disgorgement remedies in
restitution:
By preventing infringers from obtaining any net profit [, restitution] makes any would-
be infringer negotiate directly with the owner of a copyright that he wants to use,
[Vol 78:17
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justified by the need to create a stronger disincentive to wrongful
conduct-conduct that the threat of liability for actual damages does
not adequately deter.
Despite these shared attributes, it seems clear that disgorgement-
type restitution, on its face at least, is not usefully regarded or accu-
rately described as a punitive sanction. Unlike liabilities and reme-
dies whose starting objective is indemnity and compensation-and
which accordingly require additional justification whenever the
plaintiff is being overcompensated -there is no need to refer to
punishment objectives to explain what restitution is doing. Restitu-
tion's starting objective is not to compensate the plaintiff, but to strip
the defendant of a wrongful gain. More fundamentally: disgorge-
ment, prima facie at least, does not punish. We will see that the
accounting to which the wrongdoer is subject may be conducted in
such a way that it includes a punitive element. On the face of the
matter, however, the gains to the wrongdoer from the unauthorized
interference with another's interests are calculated as nearly as
possible, and liability is fixed at that amount, no more and no less.
The wrongdoer is left back where he started. Concededly, the
liability so calculated might not seem adequate, in a particular case, to
deter a malefactor with the defendant's vast resources, or to embody
a sufficient sanction for his reprehensible behavior. Unlike a regime
of punitive damages, however-in which merely to state an objection
in such terms is to justify the appropriate adjustment of the penalty-
nothing in the outward law of restitution authorizes any modification,
up or down, of the defendant's liability.
Assuming (without pursuing the matter further) that there is
nothing intrinsically punitive about the disgorgement liability associ-
ated with restitution for wrongs, is there any other feature of restitu-
tion that requires or at least suggests (Restatement to the contrary
notwithstanding) a rationale in terms of punishment? Liability in
restitution is presumptively measured by a benefit previously con-
ferred on the defendant, so the cases to be examined are those in
which a defendant is left with less than he had to start with. Such
rather than bypass the market by stealing the copyright and forcing the owner to seek
compensation from the courts for his loss. Since the infringer's gain might exceed the
owner's loss, especially as loss is measured by a court, limiting damages to that loss
would not effectively deter this kind of forced exchange.
For a broader look at the disgorgement remedy see Mark P. Gergen, What Renders Enrichment
Unjust?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1927, 1933-38 (2001).
2003]
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outcomes can certainly be identified, but we may distinguish several
types before we reach the punitive ones.
A first set of examples involves restitution defendants whose bad
behavior has in some way contributed to the claimant's loss. For
example, a defendant whose land is improved by the claimant's
mistake is ordinarily liable, if at all, only to the extent of the realized
increase in the value of the property.4 Because the cost of a noncon-
tractual improvement is almost always more than the value it pro-
duces, the transaction results in a loss that restitution allocates to the
mistaken improver. But the outcome is reversed if the defendant,
knowing that the claimant is acting under a mistake, merely sits back
and watches him perform: now the defendant will be liable for cost of
the improvement, notwithstanding that the benefit to the defendant
was something less.' If we insist that the owner's liability in both
cases is exclusively in restitution, the second case might appear to
involve a punitive remedy: to the extent that the liability exceeds the
benefit realized, the defendant has been left worse off than if the
mistaken improvement had not been made. But it seems far easier to
view the remedy in such a case as compensatory, indemnifying the
claimant against a loss that is properly charged to the defendant on a
theory of estoppel, implied contract, or tacit misrepresentation. That
the remedy may have some punitive consequence may further rec-
ommend it, but the existence of plausible explanations in terms of the
defendant's fault means that the remedy would be the same if pun-
ishment played no role. It would seem that in any case in which (a)
the defendant is at fault in some way; (b) the remedy, although
formally in restitution, is measured by the claimant's loss; and (c) the
defendant's liability exceeds the benefit received, an explanation in
terms of fault-based liability is both more direct and more persuasive
than an explanation that the remedy is partly directed at unjust
enrichment and partly at punishment.
If this reasoning is adopted, any instance of punitive restitution
will have to satisfy two conditions: as compared with the status quo
ante it must both leave the favored party with a net enrichment
(thereby excluding cases whose rationale is primarily compensatory)
4. See, e.g., McKay v. Horseshoe Lake Hop Harvesters, Inc., 491 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Or.
1971) (noting that a claimant who has improved another's property through a good faith
mistake as to title "cannot obtain reimbursement for his costs, only for the enhancement of
market value").
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10, cmt. d,
illus. 8 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
[Vol 78:17
RESTITUTION'S OUTLAWS
and leave the disfavored party with a net loss. Yet outcomes may be
skewed in this direction by an intention to protect the innocent
claimant, as well' as by an intention to punish the wrongdoing defen-
dant. Remedies in restitution frequently "overcompensate" in this
fashion, taking from the defendant more than he probably gained and
awarding the claimant more than he probably lost; but where such
results may be plausibly seen as the consequence of a determination
to protect the innocent party, they serve a remedial objective distinct
from punishment.
Examples are presented by cases in which a claimant obtains re-
scission and restitution of a transaction induced by (possibly inno-
cent) misrepresentation, or one that is subject to avoidance by reason
of the claimant's incapacity. So a purchaser of bonds who has relied
on the seller's representation that they are listed on the New York
Stock Exchange can rescind the transaction when it transpires that
the bonds were not in fact so listed. Because the bonds have lost
value in the interim (along with the rest of the bond market), the
purchaser shifts an unrelated loss to the seller.6 Because the pur-
chaser could have ratified the transaction had the market moved the
other way, restitution allows him to speculate at the seller's expense:
the value of the free option is the enrichment he retains.
Rescission for incapacity yields the same results, wherever inca-
pacity is employed -contrary to Lord Mansfield's injunction-as a
sword and not as a shield If a seventeen-year-old may purchase a
car, drive it, and then recover the purchase price without deduction,
the effect of restitution is to leave the buyer with a benefit he never
paid for and the seller with an uncompensated loss. 8 Whatever their
status within the modern law of restitution, such outcomes are
obviously not explained in terms of unjust enrichment. But an
explanation in terms of punishment does not fit them either. The
seller whose misrepresentation is neither fraudulent nor negligent is
not a candidate for punishment; nor is the seller who deals in good
faith and on reasonable terms with an incapacitated buyer. Losses
are allocated in such cases in consequence of the law's determination
6. See id. § 13, cmt. h, illus. 17 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
7. "A third rule deducible from the nature of the privilege [viz., the legal incapacity of
infancy], which is given as a shield and not as a sword, is 'that it never shall be turned into an
offensive weapon of fraud or injustice."' Zouch v. Parsons, 97 Eng. Rep. 1103, 1107 (K.B.
1765) (Mansfield, C.J.).
8. See Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545, 547, 549 (Tenn. 1992) (rejecting the outcome
described, after surveying the conflicting authorities on this issue).
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to protect the buyer from a potentially disadvantageous transaction.
Such protection comes at the expense of the seller, if need be; but a
willingness to impose this expense is independent of any determina-
tion that the seller need be punished.
Under the same heading are countless recoveries in restitution
that are simply "rounded up" to give the innocent party the benefit of
the doubt. The standard measure of liability in restitution is the
amount of the defendant's unjustified gain at the claimant's expense;
the calculations necessitated by this standard offer significant oppor-
tunities to weight the outcome in favor of the claimant. By systemati-
cally resolving uncertainties against the wrongdoer, a court will
systematically overstate the wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, imposing
a liability that might be called punitive in effect. But there is no need
to infer a punitive motive if outcomes can be justified by a rule
requiring that the malefactor, rather than his victim, bear the risk of
any uncertainty.
On this view of the question, we need not describe as punitive
even a recent decision that measures liability in restitution by the full
rental value of a converted road grader, although the grader sat
unused for most of the time it was in defendant's possession and there
was little reason to think that the owner would have been using it
either.9 Such an outcome is explained by a determination to protect
the innocent party, insuring an award "which by no possibility shall be
too small," by adopting "a figure which will favor the plaintiffs in
every reasonable chance of error."'10 By the same token, the "tracing
fictions" make no claim to evenhandedness in deciding the ownership
of a commingled fund as between the wrongdoer and his victim; nor
will the murdering heir be permitted to argue, by pointing to the
actuarial tables, that he is not unjustly enriched because he would
soon have received the money in any event. 2 Presumptions displace
9. See Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 936 (Wyo. 2000).
10. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1939) (L. Hand, J.).
11. "Equity marshals the withdrawals against the fiduciary's own funds so long as it can
because that result is deemed fairer." In re Kountze Bros., 79 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1935) (Swan,
J.). The one-sidedness of the tracing rules goes further than this. The defendant is presumed to
withdraw his own funds when the money in question is subsequently dissipated. Conversely, he
is presumed to be handling the claimant's money whenever that presumption would favor the
claimant-as where the funds withdrawn may be followed into some valuable asset.
12. "With rare exceptions there is no attempt to assess the degree of probability that the
benefit was the result of the crime. A legatee will be deprived of his legacy, an heir of his
inheritance, and an insurance beneficiary of the policy proceeds, without inquiry into the
possibility or probability that he might have obtained the benefit in any event by outliving his
victim." 4 GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 20.8 (1978).
[Vol 78:17
RESTITUTION'S OUTLAWS
probabilities in all these instances. The presumptions applied are
manifestly hostile to the wrongdoer, but the evident purpose of
protecting other parties to the transaction supplies a justification
independent of punitive motives.
II. RESTITUTION IS PUNITIVE WHEN IT WITHHOLDS A CLAIM
Restitution, like the law generally, calculates its remedies liber-
ally when deciding a claim between an innocent party and a wrong-
doer. The argument so far has been that such a response is not
necessarily punitive. But restitution does something else that the law
generally does not do: it withholds its assistance from certain disfa-
vored wrongdoers. This negative sanction-the refusal to hear an
otherwise well-founded claim-appears to be punitive, in purpose
and effect, whenever the result of the court's abstention is a windfall
to the other party that is not justified by prophylactic concerns.
Punitive restitution in this distinctive, negative form may be illus-
trated by two sets of outcomes-one prominent, the other latent. The
first and more salient consists of cases in which courts announce,
usually in so many words, that certain persons before them will be
denied the relief they are seeking-not for failure to state a cause of
action, but because those persons, by their bad conduct, have for-
feited their right to the court's assistance. That such a disposition is
intended (at least in part) to punish the rejected litigant is probably
self-evident. That these outcomes pertain to the punitive side of
restitution is less obvious, because the categories in which these cases
are usually classified-somewhere within the maze of "illegal con-
tracts" -tend to disguise the fact that the claims being disallowed are
predominantly restitution claims.
These prominent instances of punitive restitution are to be found
among a set of outcomes traditionally described by some quaint-
sounding maxims, to the effect that ex turpi causa actio non oritur,
that in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis (or possidentis); in
plain English, that no one may found a right upon his own wrong, and
that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The
common thrust of these propositions has become more difficult to
perceive - and their significance harder to gauge - now that the Latin
clich6s are no longer much used. Modern lawyers of any sophistica-
tion must doubt that a maxim (aren't those the things that travel in
pairs?) could ever be the vehicle for the transmission and enforce-
ment of a serious legal rule. And yet we have no better formula to
20031
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designate the rule in question: namely, that a party whose behavior
the court finds sufficiently reprehensible will be denied a remedy in
restitution to which he would otherwise be entitled as against the
defendant. The result of applying the rule is that the defendant is
enriched at the expense of the claimant, being allowed to retain a
benefit that-had the claimant been a better person-the defendant
would have been liable to restore. Such an outcome must surely be
classified as a punitive sanction, though it consists in the denial of a
remedy rather than in the imposition of a penalty. To the extent of
what would otherwise be his rights in restitution, the claimant is
treated as an outlaw.
The visible instances of this punitive sanction are the cases that
deny restitution because the unjust enrichment of which the claimant
complains is the result of a transaction that is fraudulent, illegal, or
both. Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim wanted to avoid
paying federal income tax on his gambling winnings. He persuaded
an employee, a Mr. Edde, to accompany him on his trips to Las Vegas
and to declare the winnings as his own. Edde did so, then wound up
paying the tax on the winnings he had fraudulently declared. When
the Sheikh failed to reimburse him for these expenditures, Edde
brought suit for breach of contract and restitution. The court granted
the Sheikh's motion to dismiss. Plainly the court would not enforce
the Sheikh's executory obligations, whatever they may have been,
under a contract of this character. The more striking result is the
dismissal of the restitution claim-a claim that on its face was unan-
swerable. Induced by fraud or by a broken promise or both, Edde
had paid the Sheikh's obligations to the United States Treasury; the
Sheikh was to that extent unjustly enriched at Edde's expense.
Denial of restitution is inexplicable unless the reason is to punish
Edde.13
13. Al-Ibrahim v. Edde, 897 F. Supp. 620 (D.D.C. 1995). Denial of restitution is the
traditional punishment of the claimant who has entrusted his property to the defendant in
furtherance of a scheme to defraud a third person, only to find himself defrauded by the
defendant. See, e.g., Primeau v. Granfield, 193 F. 911, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1911) (no accounting for
profits between partners to a fraudulent scheme). In hundreds of cases, relief has been withheld
when the claimant (in fraud of creditors) either conveys to the defendant as a secret trustee, or
purchases property in the defendant's name, and the defendant thereafter denies the claimant's
ownership interest. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Clark, 24 N.E. 71, 73 (Ill. 1890). The result is the
same when the claimant's agent buys the claimant's property on execution at an artificially low
price, pursuant to a scheme to stifle bidding in fraud of claimant's creditors, then asserts
ownership as against the claimant. See, e.g., Walker v. Hill's Ex'rs, 22 N.J. Eq. 513, 528-29
(1871). In Barnes v. Starr, 28 A. 980, 981 (Conn. 1894), the claimant sought cancellation of what
she described as a sham antenuptial agreement, executed at the instance of her deceased
[Vol 78:17
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We will find some of the most striking and characteristic in-
stances of punitive restitution among the cases in which the courts
withhold relief on the familiar ground that "the law will not aid either
party to an illegal contract," but some sifting is necessary here as well.
The most obvious feature of the sanctions imposed on illegal bar-
gains-the refusal to enforce a contract calling for an illegal perform-
ance-is not a matter of restitution law, nor does it depend on a
punitive rationale. Where the illegal contract has been performed on
one side, however, the salient aspect of the sanction becomes the
denial of restitution. Here we might draw one further distinction.
When the allowance of restitution would be tantamount to enforcing
the contract, denial of restitution is not notably punitive: contract law
denies enforcement, and the law will not stultify itself by providing
enforcement under another name. 4 By contrast, the denial of restitu-
tion is inescapably punitive where the consequences of enforcement
and restitution are easily distinguished; where restitution would be
easy to accomplish, requiring only the restoration of money or
property previously delivered by the claimant to the defendant; and
where the denial of restitution leaves the defendant with a manifest
unjust enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff.
The best cases are the simplest ones, in which the claimant has
given something of value to the defendant as the first part of a
projected illegal exchange. Chapman paid Haley $300 for $3000 in
counterfeit money. Chapman later testified that Haley had told him
to "sit down here on the walls of the water works, and he would step
right across the street here, and would get it, and be back in twenty
minutes, and he never returned." Restitution was denied."5 Thomp-
son suffered a more elaborate version of the same punishment after
he sold and delivered two cows to Williams on Sunday, the price to be
husband, in which she purported to disclaim any interest in his property at death; the purpose of
the agreement was to deceive his children by his first wife, who would otherwise have raised
objections to their elderly father's remarriage. The deceased husband induced the claimant to
sign the document by promising to destroy it after the marriage took place, then failed to do so.
The court denied cancellation and enforced the agreement as written.
14. So we need not explain in punitive terms a decision that denies restitution for valuable
legal services performed by an unlicensed attorney. It is enough to observe that a recovery in
quantum meruit would be too close to enforcement of the illegal contract. See, e.g., Spivak v.
Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1965). Peter Birks argues that the objection to restitution in
such a case is not really a matter of illegality: "The question is always whether allowing the
claim in unjust enrichment would make nonsense of the law's condemnation of the illegal
conduct in question and of its refusal to enforce the illegal contract.... In other words, there is
a widespread defense of stultification." Peter Birks, Recovering Value Transferred Under an
Illegal Contract, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 155, 202 (2000).
15. Chapman v. Haley, 80 S.W. 190, 192 (Ky. 1904).
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paid at a later date. Williams failed to pay, and Thompson retook the
cows. Williams obtained a judgment for conversion in the amount of
$75, which Thompson satisfied. Thompson's subsequent suit in
restitution for the value of the cows ($75) was dismissed on the
ground of the illegality of the original sale.1
6
Restitution's punitive sanction may be applied to wrongdoing fal-
ling short of illegality. Despite the liberal tendency of modern
decisions favoring the "plaintiff in breach" -authorizing restitution
for the value of partial performance under a contract that the plaintiff
subsequently breached-it must be doubtful whether the claim has
even been allowed to a plaintiff whose default impressed the court as
particularly reprehensible. 7 An employee whose breach of contract
was merely to walk off the job may or may not have a claim to
restitution in a given jurisdiction, but he stands a much better chance
than the employee who (after rendering a valuable part performance)
was dismissed for cause." A jurisdiction that automatically allows a
defaulting purchaser to recover payments in excess of the seller's
damages might still insist that a lawyer who withdraws from his
client's case without just cause forfeits any entitlement to compensa-
tion. 9 If restitution is denied in circumstances where the defendant
retains a net enrichment, the result is a punitive sanction for breach.
The same punishment may even be visited on a person whose
conduct, while reprehensible, does not constitute a legal wrong.
Norton, the town junk man, feuded with Haggett. Conceiving that he
would be better able to injure his enemy if he could become his
creditor, Norton inquired around the village to see if Haggett owed
any money. Learning that Haggett had a note outstanding at the
local bank, Norton went to see a bank officer and offered to "take
up" or "pay off" Haggett's debt. The banker took Norton's money
and handed over the canceled note. Realizing only later what he had
done, Norton came into court to complain-as was certainly the
case-that he had made a crucial mistake in offering to "pay off" the
note: what he had really intended to do was to buy it. This mistake
16. Thompson v. Williams, 58 N.H. 248, 249 (1878).
17. Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357(1)(a) (1932) (denying a claim in
restitution to a plaintiff whose breach of contract was "willful and deliberate"), with RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (1981) (omitting any such limitation).
18. See generally 1 PALMER, supra note 12, § 5.13(a), (c).
19. Compare Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311,313 (N.Y. 1972) (acknowledging
that U.C.C. § 2-718(2) authorizes restitution in favor of a breaching buyer of goods), with Klein
v. Eubank, 663 N.E.2d 599, 600 (N.Y. 1996) (referring to a New York rule that an attorney
withdrawing without just cause forfeits entitlement to compensation and statutory lien).
[Vol 78:17
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on Norton's part would ordinarily entitle him to restitution from
Haggett. Without meaning to do so, Norton had discharged his
enemy's debt; Haggett was unjustly enriched at Norton's expense.
The standard remedy would be to rescind Norton's transaction with
the bank or else to subrogate Norton to the bank's discharged claim
against Haggett. The court denied Norton any relief.2 0 The poetic
justice of the outcome is irresistible-tel est pris qui voulait prendre-
and unmistakably punitive.
The dramatic instances of punitive restitution are cases of this
sort, in which the outlawed party is made to forfeit altogether what
would otherwise be a straightforward entitlement to restitution as a
plaintiff. A disguised version of the same punishment runs in the
other direction, when the court denies a restitution claim (or more
typically, ignores it) asserted by a disfavored defendant. The punish-
ment is no longer an explicit refusal to hear the claim, merely a failure
to perform a full accounting of the transactions between claimant and
defendant for which defendant is liable in restitution.
21
Restitution does not generally impose forfeitures. Even within
the context of restitution for wrongs-where the defendants are
malefactors by definition-standard remedies in restitution devote
considerable effort to measuring the extent of the defendant's en-
richment at the claimant's expense. Where the defendant's enrich-
ment derives from multiple sources-partly from an unlicensed
interference with the claimant's interests, partly from the defendant's
own contributions-the ordinary methods of restitution include an
accounting designed to identify that portion of the disputed assets
constituting net unjust enrichment. An accounting that omitted an
item from the defendant's side of the ledger would overstate net
enrichment, resulting in a liability that, to the extent of the excess,
might fairly be described as punitive.
In the case that stands as the classic illustration of this relation-
ship, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer was found liable for copyright infringe-
ment: its film Letty Lynton made unauthorized use of the plaintiffs'
20. Norton v. Haggett, 85 A.2d 571, 574 (Vt. 1952).
21. The technique described is one of several methods by which courts, in awarding
restitution for wrongs, will calibrate the defendant's restitutionary liability to the circumstances
of the particular case. For an insightful review of the different approaches see Daniel Fried-




stage play on the same subject.22 This was not a case of innocent
infringement: the court found that "the borrowing was a deliberate
plagiarism."23 Even so, the defendants' liability in restitution was to
disgorge that portion of the overall profits from the film that was
fairly attributable to the infringement, not the profits derived from
"such factors as they bought and paid for; the actors, the scenery, the
producers, the directors and the general overhead"-all of which
contributed largely to the film's success.24  By the same reasoning,
when the sale of a chain of retail stores was induced by fraud, and the
stores were profitably managed and expanded for several years
thereafter by the fraudulent buyer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
approved an accounting for profits that allowed a credit for the value
of the buyer's services in running the business:
The wrong that Conston committed was in his original acquisition
of the stores, not in his operation of them; that operation was not in
competition with or to the detriment of, or in hostility to, some
other business of plaintiffs, nor will it ultimately cause them any
loss; on the contrary it has considerably enhanced the value of their
subsequently returned property; while Conston did not, of course,
realize it at the time, he was in fact, in conducting the business, not
working against, but for, plaintiffs' interests. Actions of restitution
are not punitive .... 2 5
Here as elsewhere, punitive remedies are essentially a matter of
discretion; so the opposite position is easily adopted. As the Supreme
Court explained in an earlier case of copyright infringement, denying
a claimed deduction from profits for the salaries of the infringing
publisher's employees:
We do not think that the value of the time of an infringer, or the
expense of the living of himself or his family, while he is engaged in
violating the rights of the plaintiff, is to be allowed to him as a
22. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), affd, 309 U.S.
390 (1940). Letty Lynton was a major MGM production, and its success plainly owed much
more to the studio's legitimate contributions than to any plagiarism. The film (released in 1932)
starred Joan Crawford and Robert Montgomery; it was directed by Clarence Brown; Miss
Crawford's gowns were by Adrian. According to a contemporary reviewer for The Motion
Picture Herald, "Almost everything one can wish for in entertainment has been injected into
this superbly acted and directed production. The gowns which Miss Crawford wears will be the
talk of your town for weeks after... and how she wears them!" In fact, MGM had arranged for
Macy's to sell an inexpensive copy of one of Adrian's creations in what proved to be a successful
promotional tie-in for the film. These and other details about Letty Lynton can be found (in
late 2002) on numerous web sites devoted to Joan Crawford, including
http://www.joancrawfordonline.com.
23. Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 51.
24. Id.
25. Brooks v. Conston, 72 A.2d 75, 79 (Pa. 1950) (emphasis added).
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credit, and thus the plaintiff be compelled to pay the defendant for
his time and expenses while engaged in infringing the copyright.
26
The result of this approach is that the claimant obtains profits without
deduction of the expense of producing them, and the defendant is
liable in excess of net enrichment. Such an outcome is punitive.
The courts just quoted acknowledged the choice they were mak-
ing, but the wrongdoer's claim to the value of his contributions is
more commonly passed over in silence if the claim is denied. Exam-
ples include some famous cases. The award of a fractional share of
the profits derived from the Great Onyx Cave, to which the defen-
dant admitted paying customers in the knowledge that they were
trespassing under the claimant's land, seemingly took account of
defendant's out-of-pocket expenditures for such items as electric light
(inasmuch as the liability was based on "net profits" from the enter-
prise), but allowed nothing for defendant's labor and enterprise in
developing the cave as a tourist attraction.27 The judgment requiring
Frank Snepp to turn over to the United States the royalties derived
from the book he wrote in breach of his contractual and fiduciary
obligations to the Central Intelligence Agency made no allowance for
the value of his contribution as an author.28 A distiller who made
corn into whiskey, knowing that the corn was stolen, had to surrender
the whiskey to the former owner of the corn-without compensation
for his labor in transforming the original materials.
2 9
In each of these cases, the claimant recovers more than the de-
fendant's net enrichment because the court declines to recognize the
defendant's implicit claim for his own contribution to the assets in
dispute. The outcomes mirror those in the first set of cases-denying
an entitlement to restitution altogether, where the disfavored party
presents himself as the plaintiff-because the implicit claim that is
rejected in each case is a claim in restitution. Each, moreover, is a
claim that would succeed if asserted in other circumstances. If the
26. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 664 (1888).
27. Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. 1936).
28. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1980).
29. Silsbury & Calkins v. McCoon & Sherman, 3 N.Y. 379, 392-93 (1850). The transforma-
tion of corn into whiskey makes an exotic variation of the standard case in American law, which
involves liability for converted timber. A knowing converter who transforms stolen logs into
finished lumber remains liable to the timber owner for the products or their value, wherever
they are found, with no allowance for the cost of cutting, hauling, sawing, and planing; while the
innocent converter (typically someone who has mistaken a boundary in the woods) is liable to
the owner for stumpage only. See, e.g., Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 434-
35 (1882).
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distiller were an innocent converter, he could set off against his strict
liability in conversion the value of his unrequested services in improv-
ing the owner's corn. Had Snepp's wrongdoing consisted merely of
copyright infringement, he might have retained the portion of his
royalties that was attributable to his own skill as an author-as
opposed to the material in which the CIA claimed a protectible
interest. Had the trespass within the Great Onyx Cave been inno-
cent, the defendant would (at the very least) be entitled to compensa-
tion for his services in creating the valuable business of which the
claimant, his neighbor, is revealed as part owner.
III. THE NEGATIVE SANCTION IS CHARACTERISTIC OF
RESTITUTION.
Restitution is commonly said not to be punitive, because the
people who make that observation are looking at what restitution
does. The punitive side of restitution is found in what restitution
refuses to do. In a number of recurring situations, some highly visible
and some less so, the law of restitution denies to disfavored litigants
entitlements that it acknowledges in others. Our hypothesis is that
this negative sanction (by contrast to the affirmative imposition or
enhancement of a penalty) is somehow characteristic of restitution,
and not a feature of the law's treatment of disfavored parties gener-
ally.
The frequency with which restitution imposes this negative pun-
ishment is not as apparent as it might be, because the pattern of
decisions has to be pieced together from sources we might not imme-
diately think of consulting. The unaccustomed form of the rules that
authorize courts to treat some litigants as outlaws-a miscellaneous
collection of Latin and English maxims-tends to disguise the fact
that the cases in which those maxims actually determine outcomes are
typically concerned with restitution. Again, the cases revealing the
richest vein of punitive restitution tend to be discussed in the older
contracts treatises, in the chapters devoted to "illegal contracts."
3
Even here, the true instances of punitive restitution are lumped
together with decisions that merely refuse to enforce illegal bargains,
30. Thus, the general topic of "Illegal Bargains" occupies an entire volume of Corbin's
treatise in its 1962 edition. See 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1962). A few
sections in the concluding chapter address directly the denial of restitution as one of the "effects
of illegality," but instances of punitive restitution (as described in the present article) are
scattered throughout the volume.
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making the distinctiveness of restitution's negative sanction harder to
perceive.
The legal entitlements that are denied for punitive effect tend to
be restitution claims, rather than claims based on other sources of
liability. A tort plaintiff need not display clean hands to collect
damages.31 Property law protects the thief against theft.32 Contract
law presents a somewhat more complicated question. Plainly the law
will not lend its aid to the commission of a wrong, so an executory
contract that is illegal, or fraudulently induced, is obviously unen-
forceable at the instance of a wrongdoer. But when the suit to
enforce such a contract is dismissed, is the outcome properly regarded
as punitive? We might respond, without quibbling, that the propo-
nent of the illegal or fraudulent contract has lost nothing he ever had.
(His disappointed expectation is not one the law should protect,
assuming he knew of the illegality.) By contrast, once the same
contract has been performed on the plaintiff's side, his viable claim is
in restitution; and to deny that entitlement is unmistakably punitive.
Suppose that A pays a bribe to B in exchange for B's promise to take
some illegal action. B takes the money but fails to keep his promise.
Given a hypothetical suit by A against B for specific performance or
consequential damages, would the dismissal of the claim-a foregone
conclusion-be a punitive result? But if A sues B in restitution,
seeking only to recover the money paid as a bribe, can the dismissal
of the claim be described any other way?33
In short: restitution, unlike tort or contract, will sometimes treat
the claimant's bad behavior as an affirmative defense. (This is not the
way these outcomes are ever described in the decisions, but it accu-
rately indicates their effect.) Unlike the other affirmative defenses to
restitution-mostly versions of good-faith purchase and change of
31. So while the landowner may owe the trespasser only a qualified duty of care-
particularly if the trespasser's presence is unknown-it has been long been a judicial common-
place that "the trespasser is not an outlaw." See, e.g., Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 131 N.E. 898,
899 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.). By extension:
A person who gets upon a railroad train without obtaining a ticket or paying his fare is
a trespasser and may be put off the train at some convenient place, but he is not to be
regarded as an outlaw, and if he has been driven off the train and shot with a gun by an
authorized employee of the railroad company, the railroad company is liable for the
tort.
Lampkin v. Chicago Great W. R. Co., 44 P.2d 210, 210-11 (Kan. 1935).
32. See Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722) (rejecting defense of ius tertii
in action for conversion of jewel brought by chimney sweep, who had found it, against
goldsmith, whose apprentice had taken it).
33. See, e.g., Womack v. Maner, 301 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Ark. 1957) (dismissing a claim to
restitution of a bribe paid to a judge for an illegal act that was not performed).
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position-the function of this one is not to protect the defendant but
to punish the plaintiff.
The inspiration for punitive restitution is not difficult to infer. It
might at first be supposed that a concern for the probity of litigants is
peculiar to equity (hence the "clean hands" maxim), and that restitu-
tion is peculiarly equitable.34 This would be an elementary error on
two counts. The operative rules (such as "in pari delicto") are as
much legal as equitable, as are the instances of punitive restitution.
For example, the claim to recover the bribe from the defaulting bribe-
taker, if it were allowed, would be purely a matter of law. On the
other hand, it is perfectly true that the bribe-giver's restitution
claim-like every claim in unjust enrichment, whether legal or
equitable-is usually thought to involve an assertion that the bribe-
taker is subject to a duty (namely, to return the bribe) imposed on
him by equity and good conscience. The obvious idea for punishment
is that a person who in some transaction has not acted conscientiously
should potentially forfeit his claim to conscientious behavior in others
in the same connection.
The idea becomes irresistible in many of its applications, because
the punishment that results from this forfeiture has an aptness that
legal sanctions generally lack. Unlike a fine or a prison term-by
which the court merely imposes an arbitrary and extraneous injury on
the wrongdoer-the denial of restitution to the bribe-giver causes him
to suffer as a direct consequence of his own misdeeds.
It is doubtful that punishment of this kind has any deterrent ef-
fect whatsoever. The person who is considering whether to offer a
bribe is unlikely to weigh the chances of a later recourse in restitu-
tion.35 But as retributive justice it has an unmistakable charm.
34. For a survey of the prevailing confusion (notably in the U.S. federal courts) about the
extent to which restitution is "equitable," see Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary
Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577 (2002).
35. See John W. Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions-Reasons For and
Against Allowing Restitution, 25 TEX. L. REV. 31, 48-51 (1946).
